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Abstract 
 
This paper builds a model of growth through industrialization, where 
machines replace workers in a growing number of tasks. This enables the 
economy to experience long-run growth, as machines become servants of 
humans, and as their number grows unboundedly. The mechanism that drives 
growth is feedback between industrialization and wages. High wages provide 
incentives to use machines, while industrialization raises wages. The model 
shows that industrialization and growth take off only if the economy is 
productive enough. It also shows that monopoly power can stifle growth, as it 
lowers wages. Hence, a one-time increase in productivity, or a reduction of 
monopoly power can push economies from stagnation to industrialization. 
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 Machines as Engines of Growth 
1. Introduction 
During the last two hundred years global output per capita has grown by more than 8. In 
the more developed countries output per capita has grown by twice as much. Such rapid 
growth has never been experienced before. It is therefore a new historical phenomenon of 
less than two centuries, which began with the industrial revolution, somewhere around 
1820, according to Maddison (1995, 2001). This paper is part of the ongoing effort to 
explain this new historical phenomenon. It focuses on industrialization and claims that 
growth has been made possible by creating machines that can perform various jobs that 
humans performed before, and replace workers. Most common examples are the steam 
engine, the car and the computer. Hence, machines have become our servants and have 
enabled us to increase production significantly. Unlike scarce humans, machines are 
available in increasing numbers, since they are easily created. Hence, productivity 
increases by using this ever growing army of servants, machines. 
 This paper builds a growth model that formalizes this idea. It describes a world 
where the final good is produced by many intermediate goods. Initially, each intermediate 
good is produced by workers and by some amount of capital, mainly tools and structures. 
A machine that replaces these workers can be invented, but this machine is costly as it 
increases the amount of capital in production. Hence, machines are used and there is 
demand for them only if their cost is lower than the alternative cost of production by 
labor. This leads to an important implication of this approach, namely that machines are 
invented and used only when wages are sufficiently high. Otherwise it does not pay to 
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buy the machine and producers keep using labor instead. Hence, according to this 
approach, invention of such technologies depends on factor prices. 
 Growth therefore depends positively on wages, but it affects wages as well. If 
more intermediate goods are produced by machines, outputs of these intermediate goods 
increase. As a result, wages of workers in other sectors rise, since intermediate goods are 
complements. This creates a feedback between growth and wages, which can explain 
how growth continues over time. Note, that in this model replacing workers by machines 
does not substitute factors of production along the same technology, as in standard 
economic models, but requires a change in technology. This explains how capital can 
replace workers in this model without significantly diminishing marginal productivity. 
 The model shows that long-run growth depends on the overall productivity of the 
economy, which is fixed overtime. This productivity reflects geography, infrastructure 
and other factors. Productivity affects the growth rate through wages. If it is high enough, 
wages are high and growth goes on. If not, the process of industrialization and growth 
might come to a stop at some point. If overall productivity is very low, industrialization 
might not even take off at all. Hence, the fixed productivity affects positively the long-
run rate of growth. Interestingly monopoly has an opposite effect on growth. If producers 
of intermediate goods have monopoly power, it raises profits on expense of wages, and 
lower wages deter growth. 
 These results can shed light on potential origins of the industrial revolution. One 
possibility is that the increase in productivity after the discovery of America pushed the 
global economy from a stagnant pre-industrial equilibrium to a new equilibrium, of on-
going industrialization. Another possibility is that the collapse of Feudalism, with its 
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established monopoly rights, and the opening of free labor markets, led to the industrial 
revolution by raising the cost of labor. These two historical hypotheses, which are 
suggested by the model, are of course very preliminary and deserve more research. 
 The paper also includes an extension, which introduces in addition to the physical 
good a service good, which is not going through the process of replacing workers by 
machines. This extension of the model leads to an interesting result. Despite the decline 
of the share of labor income in industrial production, as capital replaces labor, the share 
of labor income in the overall economy does not fall, as is indeed observed in reality. 
 This paper is related to two lines of endogenous growth literature, one that 
focuses on capital accumulation, and one that studies technical progress. The first goes 
back to Solow (1956), but its recent versions are the AK models of Jones and Manuelli 
(1990) and Rebelo (1991). The second line of literature, R&D based endogenous growth 
models, was developed by Romer (1990), Segestrom, Anant, and Dinopolous (1990), 
Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Jones (1995, a, b). This 
paper contains elements of both, but also differs significantly from both. Growth is driven 
by capital accumulation as in AK models but capital accumulation involves continuous 
changes in the production function, namely innovations, as in the R&D based models. 
The main similarity to AK models is that the marginal productivity of capital is 
bounded from below. But there are two significant differences. The first is that this model 
presents micro-foundations to such a production function. The second is that in AK 
models growth is driven by profitability, while in this model it is driven by wages. As a 
result the effect of monopoly power is opposite in the two models. This paper also differs 
significantly from R&D based growth models. First, the cost of using a new innovation is 
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not only the cost of invention, but also the cost of the machine, in which the innovation is 
embedded. This leads to very different dynamics, especially with respect to scale, as 
shown in the paper. Second, this paper tries to answer a question left unanswered by 
R&D models: how can innovations increase productivity? How can obscure scribbles of 
inventors increase productivity of millions of workers? This paper suggests that by 
inventing machines that perform jobs previously done by workers innovators invent 
servants that help us in production. This happens to be more than just an explanation to 
the content of innovations, but it also affects the dynamics of growth significantly. 
 The idea of innovations that substitute labor with capital has appeared before in 
Champernowne (1963) and in Habbakuk (1962).1 This idea is also modeled in Zeira 
(1998), but that paper studies a very different issue, of technology adoption and output 
differences across countries, assuming technical change is exogenous.2 The current paper 
uses this idea in a very different framework, of global growth, and adds to the analysis 
endogenous invention of technologies.3 
 The paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model. 
Section 3 describes industrialization and Section 4 examines the dynamics of long-run 
growth. Section 5 discusses the effect of monopoly power on growth. Section 6 examines 
the case of costly innovation. Section 7 presents possible explanations to the industrial 
revolution. Section 8 discusses the dynamics of the shares of labor and capital in income. 
Section 9 studies other issues, like divergence and energy prices. Section 10 summarizes 
and an Appendix contains mathematical proofs. 
                                                 
1 Capital augmented technical progress appears already in Solow (1960) and other earlier works, but they 
do not use the idea of technology as substituting labor by capital. 
2 That paper is more related to the literature on ‘appropriate technologies’. See Basu and Weil (1998). 
3 Beaudry and Collard (2002) use a similar idea as well, in analyzing employment dynamics.  
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 2. The Model 
This section describes the benchmark model of growth and industrialization. Consider a 
closed economy, which produces one final good, which is used both for consumption and 
for investment. The final good is produced by a continuum of intermediate goods, 
ordered on [0, 1]. Production of the final good in period t, Yt, is described by a Cobb-
Douglas production function:4 
(1)   ,)(logloglog
1
0
∫+= diixaY tt
where xt(i) is the amount of the intermediate good i used in production in period t and a is 
a productivity parameter, which holds for the aggregate economy. It is later shown that 
this productivity parameter plays an important role in the dynamics of the model. 
 Each intermediate good can be produced by one of two potential technologies, 
pre-industrial (manual) or industrial. Both technologies operate in fixed proportions. In 
the pre-industrial technology one unit of the intermediate good i is produced by l(i) units 
of labor and k(i) units of capital. Capital fully depreciates after one period of time, 
namely time units are long. Capital in this pre-industrial technology consists of structures 
and tools, but not machines. The industrial technology introduces a machine that can 
produce the same intermediate good. A machine that consists of m(i) units of capital can 
replace the old technology and produce one unit of the intermediate good i. Depreciation 
is full under this technology as well. It is assumed that the invention of such a machine is 
costless, so that a machine is invented once there is demand for it.5 
                                                 
4 Alternative production functions, like CES, yield the same results. 
5 The case of costly innovation is analyzed in Section 6.  
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 We next add two assumptions on the function m, which lead to the result of long-
run growth. First, order the intermediate goods by increasing cost of machines, m(i), and 
assume that: 
(2)  .)( 1 ∞→→iim  
Namely, machines required to produce intermediate goods, which are close to 1, become 
increasingly complicated and costly. In other words, some jobs, like a CEO, or an 
engineer, are very hard to replace by a machine. It is also assumed that this increasing 
complexity does not make overall industrialization too expensive, namely the sum of 
logarithms of machine costs over all potential machines is bounded: 
(3)   .log)(log
1
0
∞<=∫ bdiim
The parameter b, which is finite, is therefore defined by equation (3). This second 
assumption is necessary for long-run growth, as shown below.6 For the sake of simplicity 
assume that the functions k, l, and m are all continuous. 
 Next describe individuals in this economy. Assume that there is a mass L of 
identical individuals with infinite horizons. Each person supplies 1 unit of labor in each 
period and has the following utility from consumption: 
(4)  .
)1(
)log(
0
∑∞
= += t t
tcU ρ  
The use of logarithmic utility is for simplification only and the results of the paper hold 
for any utility function. 
 
                                                 
6 Actually, if a CES production function is used in (1), instead of Cobb-Douglas, (3) is not required if the 
elasticity of substitution is greater than 1. 
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3. Industrialization and Factor Prices 
The main decision facing producers is the choice of technology, namely whether to stick 
to the old pre-industrial technology or to industrialize. The decision depends on factor 
prices, since industrialization involves reduction of labor, but at the expense of 
purchasing more capital. Producers of i adopt the new technology and industrialize in 
period t if: 
   ),()()( ilwikRimR ttt +≤
where wt is the wage rate and Rt is the gross rental rate of capital or the gross interest rate, 
paid in period t on capital invested in period t – 1. Written differently, production of i is 
industrialized if: 
  .
)(
)()(
t
t
R
w
il
ikim ≤−  
Thus, the set of intermediate goods produced by machines in period t, which is called the 
industrial set It, is equal to: 
(5)  .)()()(:



 +≤= il
R
w
ikimiI
t
t
t  
Hence, the degree of industrialization depends crucially on the wage rate relative to the 
rate of return. Higher wages relative to the gross rate of return create an incentive to 
invent and use more technologies, as these enable reduction of costly labor input. Lower 
wages deter industrialization, as workers are inexpensive relative to costly machines. 
 Figure 1 describes the industrialization of the economy, namely the industrial set 
in period t, as described by equation (5). Clearly, as the ratio of factor prices wt/Rt rises, 
the industrial set It increases. Note that if the factors’ price ratio wt/Rt is very low, no 
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intermediate good is industrialized, since  for all i, so that the industrial set is 
empty. This is the case of a pre-industrialized economy, like the world prior to the 
industrial revolution. As is clear from this figure and from the analysis above, the degree 
of industrialization depends on the factor prices of labor and capital. We next turn to 
describe how these prices are determined. 
)()( ikim >
m(i) 
k(i)+l(i)wt/Rt 
i 
It 1 
Figure 1 
 
 Perfect competition in the markets for intermediate goods leads to the following 
profit maximization condition: 
(6)  .
)()(
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Y
ix
Y
ip
t
t
t
t
t =∂
∂=  
This describes the demand for the intermediate good. Its supply is perfectly elastic due to 
fixed marginal productivity. Hence the price of each intermediate good is: 
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Substituting (7) in (6) and then in (1) we get the following relationship between the wage 
rate, the interest rate and the degree of industrialization: 
(8)   
.log)]()(log[)](log[
)]}()(log[)],(min{log[
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This equation defines the factor price frontier. 
 An alternative way to present equation (8) is to view the integral on the LHS as a 
function of the two factor prices, namely: 
(9)   .)]}()(log[)],(min{log[),(
1
0
∫ += diiwliRkiRmRwH
It can be shown that H is concave and increasing in both w and R. From equation (8) it 
follows that the factor price frontier is defined by: 
(10)   .log),( aRwH tt =
The factor price frontier can also be written as an explicit function: , where h 
is defined by . 
)( tt Rhw =
aRRhH log]),([ =
 It is easy to show that h is decreasing and convex. The next lemma shows that the 
gross rate of interest is bounded from below on the factor price frontier. 
 
Lemma 1: The factor price frontier satisfies: . Hence, as the wage w goes to ∞, 
the gross interest rate R goes to a / b. 
baR /≥
Proof: In the Appendix.  
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Figure 2 describes the factor price frontier, )( tt Rhw = , based on Lemma 1. It also 
describes how the levels of output and capital per worker are determined by the factor 
price frontier. To see this we analyze the equilibrium conditions in the labor market and 
in the capital market. The labor market equilibrium condition is: 
(11)  .
)()(
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)()( ∫∫ +== c
t
c
t I tt
t
I
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The capital allocation condition is: 
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We next add to these two conditions the results of the following lemma. 
Lemma 2: The function H satisfies: 
  w
I
Hdi
iRkiwl
il
c
=+∫ )()( )( , 
and: 
  R
II
H
iRm
imdi
iRkiwl
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c
=++ ∫∫ )()()()( )( . 
Hence:   .1=+ wR wHRH
Proof: In the Appendix. 
 
From equation (11) and Lemma 2 we derive the following equilibrium condition: 
(13)   ).,( ttwt RwHYL =
This condition determines the level of output Yt as a function of the factor prices. From 
the capital allocation condition (12) and from Lemma 2 we get: 
(14)   ).,( ttRtt RwHYK =
Hence, the capital labor ratio is equal to: k )(// twRtt RhHHLK ′−=== . Namely, the 
capital labor ratio is the slope of the factor price frontier. To graphically describe output 
per worker, note that due to Lemma 2, total gross income is equal to gross output: 
  .)( tRtwttttt YHRHwYKRLw =+=+  
Hence output per worker can also be described by Figure 2: 
(15)  .ttt
t
tt
t
t kRwL
K
Rw
L
Y
y +=+==  
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Figure 2 also describes the output-capital ratio, which we denote by qt: 
  .
t
t
t k
y
q =  
Clearly qt is increasing with Rt and converges to a/b as Rt goes down to a/b. 
 
4. The Dynamics of Industrialization 
The dynamic solution of the model follows the two standard conditions of a 
representative agent economy. One is the first order condition of utility maximization: 
(16)  .
1
11
ρ+=
++ t
t
t R
c
c
 
The second condition is the goods market equilibrium condition: 
(17)  ).()()( 111 +++ ′+′−=−+=−= ttttttttttt RhRhRRhkkRwkyc  
The dynamic Rational Expectations solution to these two dynamic equations, which 
satisfies the No-Ponzi-Game condition, is a saddle path that converges to a steady state. 
We next show that there are two dynamic cases. 
 In order to analyze the dynamics of this economy, where consumption can grow 
forever, we define a new variable, the ratio between consumption and capital: 
  .
t
t
t k
c
v =  
Substituting in equations (16) and (17) we derive two dynamic equations of the system 
with the variables vt and Rt. The equation that describes the dynamics of R is: 
(18)  .
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t
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The dynamics of v are described by:   
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 In order to analyze the dynamics of the economy, we draw the phase diagram of 
the system in Figures 3a and 3b. The curve Rt+1 = Rt is derived from (18) and is described 
by  for , which is an increasing curve, and also by the vertical line 
. The curve v
1−= tt qv
ba /=
baRt />
Rt t+1 = vt is derived from (19) and is the solution to the following 
equation: 
  .
1
),(
1
11
ρρ +−=+−=
++ ttt
t
t
tt
vRRqRqv  
It can be shown that this curve has a smaller slope than the tt RR =+1  curve.  
 Next we differentiate between two cases. In the first case productivity is low, so 
that ρ+≤1/ba . This case is described in Figure 3a, where the two curves of the phase 
diagram intersect at ρ+=1tR . The dynamic path is described by the saddle path in 
Figure 3a. Note that in this case the growth rate falls to zero at the steady state, since the 
steady state rate of interest is equal to ρ. Hence consumption does not grow at the steady 
state, and since v is constant at the steady state, capital per worker k and output do not 
grow as well. Therefore, this case describes an economy where industrialization and 
growth of output per capita come to a stop as the economy reaches the steady state. An 
even more extreme sub-case is when industrialization does not begin at all. This occurs 
when productivity a is very small. This happens if the two curves in Figure 1 do not 
intersect at all. In this case the economy remains in a pre-industrialized equilibrium. 
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Rt+1=Rt vt 
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Rt 
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Figure 3a 
 
 The second case is when productivity a is sufficiently high, so that ρ+>1/ba . 
This case is described in Figure 3b, where the economy converges on a saddle path to the 
following steady state:  and baR /* = ρ
ρ
+= 1* b
av . Therefore, the economy experiences 
long-run growth. Formally, the rate of growth of consumption converges to g, where: 
(20)  .01
)1(
>−+= ρb
ag  
Since vt converges to a finite number and so does xt, it follows that both output and 
capital grow permanently and that their long-run growth rates are equal to g as well. 
Hence, this model of machines that replace workers can generate long-run growth. 
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We can therefore summarize the above discussion in the following Proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: There is a unique equilibrium path. If a > b(1 + ρ) the economy grows 
forever and the rate of growth converges to g. If a ≤ b(1 + ρ), growth peters out and the 
economy converges to a steady state without growth. 
 
 This model therefore shows that the long-run rate of growth depends crucially on 
the overall productivity of the economy a. A one-time shock to productivity can lead to 
increased growth over a long period of time and even to permanent growth. To gain a 
 15
better understanding of this result we further analyze the aggregate production function in 
the next proposition, which also proves the optimality of the competitive equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 2: Let  be the maximum amount of output that can be produced by L 
workers and K
),( LKF t
t capital. Then: Y ),( LKF tt = . Namely, production is optimal in the market 
economy. Also, the marginal productivities of labor and capital are equal to wt and Rt, 
respectively. Furthermore, the intertemporal equilibrium is optimal as well. 
Proof: In the Appendix. 
 
 Proposition 2 can help us better understand the strong dependency of dynamics on 
productivity a. The marginal productivity of capital, when technology is endogenous, is 
bounded from below by a/b. Hence, if this bound is sufficiently large, long-run growth 
prevails. In this respect the model is very similar to the AK models of Jones and Manueli 
(1990) and Rebelo (1991). But it also differs significantly from these AK models. First, it 
has a micro-model of technology and innovation, which generates the AK relation. 
Second, the mechanism through which the economy grows is very different. While in the 
AK models growth is driven by the high marginal productivity of capital, in this model it 
is driven by high wages. High productivity raises labor costs and increases the incentives 
to use more machines. Once these additional machines are used, wages rise by more, 
since intermediate goods cooperate in the production of the final good. That raises the 
incentive to invest in more costly machines and put them into use. And so the process of 
industrialization is rolling on, creating incentives for further industrialization at each step 
on the way. This difference between the two models is not just in the description of the 
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mechanism of growth, but it also has significant implication, like the effect of monopoly 
power on growth, which is discussed in the next section. 
 
5. Monopolies, Wages and Growth 
In this section we deviate from perfect competition and examine what happens if 
producers of intermediate goods have monopoly power. This can reflect social norms, 
like Feudalism, or other causes. We assume that the monopoly power is exogenous and 
examine how it affects growth. Intuitively, the effect of monopoly power on growth 
should be negative, since monopoly power enables producers to reduce wages and that 
reduces growth in this framework. The rest of the section formalizes this insight. 
 Assume that producers of intermediate goods have a monopoly power so that they 
earn a profit, which equals a share z of revenues. Such profits arise for example when 
there are N producers of each intermediate good, who form an oligopoly. If they 
participate in a Cournot competition and if N > 1, then in a symmetric equilibrium each 
producer earns a profit, which is equal to a share z of revenues, where: 
  .1
N
z =  
If producers earn a profit of rate z of revenues, the price of each intermediate good is: 
(21)  
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Combining (21) with equation (6) and substituting in equation (1) we get the following 
factor price frontier: 
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 Hence, in a monopolistic economy the factor price frontier is affected not only by 
productivity a, but by the degree of monopoly power z as well. As monopoly power 
increases the factor price frontier shifts to the left. It is clear from (22) that as wages rise 
to infinity, the gross rate of interest R converges to: 
  ).1( z
b
a −  
The solution of the rest of the model is the same as in Section 4, except that a/b is 
replaced by a(1 – z)/b.7 Thus, the condition for long-run growth is more restrictive under 
monopoly: 
  .1)1( ρ+>− z
b
a  
If this condition holds and the economy experiences long-run growth, its steady state 
growth rate is: 
  .1
)1(
)1( −+
−= ρb
zag  
Hence, monopoly power impedes growth and it can even bar the economy from growing 
and keep it stagnant. This result is opposite to that of AK models, where higher 
profitability contributes to growth. The mechanism through which the monopoly effect 
operates in this model is by lowering wages, which is detrimental to growth.8 
 
                                                 
7 Note that although agents are not identical under monopoly, as workers and producers earn different 
incomes, the dynamic equations of the model are the same. Since consumption dynamics are linear for each 
individual: ct+1 = ct Rt+1 (1+ρ)-1, they can be aggregated across individuals. The goods market equilibrium 
condition is also the same: kt+1 = yt – ct.  
8 The effect of wages on growth is also studied recently by Saint-Paul (2005), but through its effect on 
consumption and demand. 
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6. Costly Innovations and the Effect of Scale 
While section 5 examines the differences between this model and the AK literature, this 
section compares this model with the other literature on endogenous growth, the R&D 
based models. Similar to these models growth in this paper is also driven by new 
innovations. But the existing R&D models focus only on the innovation cost of new 
technologies, while this paper emphasizes the capital cost of the machines within which 
the new technologies are embodied. So far the model has assumed for simplicity that the 
cost of innovation is zero. This section examines what happens if the cost of innovation is 
positive, so the comparison with R&D based growth models becomes more transparent. 
 Consider the model presented in Section 2 with the following extension. Inventing 
a new machine is costly. The cost of innovation It is assumed to be proportional to output 
per capita:9 
(23)  .
L
Y
dI tt =  
For simplicity assume that a patent on innovation lasts only one period and in next 
periods the innovation becomes public knowledge. Hence, a machine i, which is invented 
in period t-1, costs m(i) in future periods, but )()( izim +  in the first period, namely when 
invested in period t-1. Due to competition among innovators the patent fee z(i) for an 
invented machine is equal to: 
(24)  ,
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where gt is the growth rate at time t. 
                                                 
9 This is of course a simplifying assumption. Alternative assumptions on cost, like wages, yield similar 
results. 
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The price of the good in first period of invention is equal to: 
   ).()()( izRimRip ttt +=
Together with (24) this yields: 
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Hence, a machine i is introduced in period t if: 
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Equation (26) shows that with costly innovations there is a scale effect, and a 
larger scale L can speed innovations and growth. But the scale effect in this model is 
diminishing, and as L becomes large the scale effect becomes negligible and the model 
converges to the benchmark model from Section 2. Thus, the scale effect, which is so 
troubling in the original R&D growth models, as shown by Jones (1995a), is much 
reduced here. The intuitive reason for that is straightforward. The cost of adopting an 
innovation is the sum of the cost of innovation and the cost of the physical machine in 
which the innovation is embodied. As scale increases the cost of innovation per user falls, 
but the capital cost of the machine remains unchanged. Hence, the benefit from scale is 
diminishing. Thus, scale can help economic growth, but only to a limited and diminishing 
extent. 
 
7. The Industrial Revolution 
The next three sections turn to some empirical implications of the model presented in this 
paper. This section examines how it can contribute to understanding the timing of the 
industrial revolution. We know from various sources, like Maddison (1995), that 
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economic growth is a fairly recent phenomenon. It started somewhere in the beginning of 
the 19th century and has been going steadily since then. It is also clear that growth is 
inherently related to the process of industrialization. Hence, this model of growth through 
industrialization seems suitable to study the industrial revolution. We should therefore 
ask what, according to this model, can push the economy from a pre-industrial 
equilibrium into industrialization. 
 Theoretically, the model offers two potential explanations, namely two exogenous 
events that could have triggered the industrial revolution. One is a rise in productivity a. 
If a rise in productivity takes it over the threshold of b(1 + ρ), it can start a process of 
long-run growth, as shown in Section 4. Thus, a rise in productivity could have triggered 
the industrial revolution, by increasing the cost of labor and creating incentives to invent 
machines and then use them all over the world. The second potential explanation to the 
industrial revolution according to this model could be a reduction in monopoly power. A 
stagnant economy can start industrialization and economic growth by reducing its 
monopoly power, as shown in Section 5. The reduction of monopoly power raises wages 
and creates incentives to industrialization. A third possible explanation could be an 
increase of scale, as the R&D growth models claim and as shown in Section 6 of this 
paper. We focus in this section on the two first potential explanations, as they are more 
unique to this model. 
 What are the historical equivalents of an increase in productivity or of a reduction 
in monopoly power prior to the industrial revolution? Two possible answers come to 
mind. One possible rise in productivity in Western Europe could be the results of the 
discovery of America, that contributed to sea faring, to agriculture, through new plants 
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and animals, and also by adding new territories, as described in Maddison (2001, p. 18). 
This discovery raised incomes and as a result the cost of labor increased as well. The rise 
in income after the discovery of America is documented in Maddison (2001). Between 
1500 and 1820 income per capita in Western Europe, North America and Japan increased 
by more than 60%. This gives some indication to an increase in productivity. Hence, the 
discovery of America, and the rise in productivity it brought, could be one potential 
trigger to the beginning of the industrial revolution. 
 The other historical development that could have triggered the industrial 
revolution was the decline of Feudalism. This process started in England with the 
Cromwell Revolution, was accelerated by the spread of Protestantism, and was further 
intensified with the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. During the 19th century 
all over Europe the old system of control by few over land and production began 
crumbling down. Our model claims that these historical developments could also trigger 
and enable the industrial revolution. 
 The scope of this paper is of course not sufficient to seriously assess these two 
explanations to the beginning of the industrial revolution. It is possible that the two 
historical developments together contributed to it. It is also possible that the two events 
were not completely independent of one another, and the discovery of America 
contributed to the decline of Feudalism. Indeed, many writers have noted how closely 
related were the discovery of America, the collapse of Feudalism and the industrial 
revolution.10 The specific contribution of this paper is twofold. The first is to point at the 
causality from the two events to the industrial revolution, and the second is to point at the 
cost of labor as the main mechanism of effect. 
                                                 
10 One example that comes to mind is of course the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels (1998). 
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 8. The Shares of Labor and Capital 
The model of machines that replace workers in various stages of production yields some 
very realistic results, as shown above. It can explain how output can grow at high rates 
over a long period of time. It explains how the capital-labor ratio grows with output. But 
this model has one result which is in contrast with the empirical experience. According to 
the benchmark model the share of capital in output, which is equal to Rt/qt, rises to 1, 
while the share of labor in output falls gradually to zero. This has not happened in the last 
two centuries of economic growth, during which the shares of labor and capital have been 
quite stable at around 2/3 and 1/3 respectively. In this section we present an extension of 
the model that avoids this unrealistic result of diminishing share of labor, but maintains 
the other results of the model. 
This section adds a second final good to the economy. This good is produced with 
capital and labor, but is assumed to have no technical progress and there are no machines 
that can help in its production. Many services fit this description, like education, arts and 
literature, personal services, etc. We therefore assume that there are two goods in the 
economy. One is a physical good that is produced as described in Section 2, and is used 
for consumption and investment. The other good is services, which is used for 
consumption only, and is produced by labor and capital in fixed proportions. One unit of 
services is produced by 1 unit of labor and k* units of capital. Utility is derived from 
consumption of the physical good c and consumption of the service good s: 
(27)  .
)1(
loglog
0
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= +
+
t
t
tt sc
ρ
α  
It is further assumed that the size of the population is fixed and equal to 1. 
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 Due to perfect competition in the labor market and to the linear technology of 
production of services, the price of the service good is *kRw tt + . It follows that the 
demand for the service good satisfies: 
(28)  .
*kRw
c
s
tt
t
t +=
α
 
In other words, the share of services in total consumption expenditure is )1/( αα + . The 
solution of the model leads to the following result: 
 
Proposition 3: If productivity is sufficiently high, )1( ρ+> ba , there is sustainable long-
run growth, as in the benchmark model. Also, the share of labor does not diminish to zero 
and it converges in the long-run to 
  .
1 αρρ
αρ
++  
Proof: In the Appendix. 
 
Note that if α = 2, so that the share of services in consumption is 2/3, and if ρ = 3, 
which is reasonable for a period of 30 years, we get that the share of labor in income 
converges to .6. Hence, the model, despite its great simplification, leads to results which 
resemble the stylized facts. 
This extension of the model, therefore, avoids the result that the share of labor in 
income is diminishing to zero. It also has an additional interesting result. The share of 
labor in services increases continually. This has two intuitive explanations. One is that 
less and less workers are required in manufacturing, since they are replaced by machines. 
Second, the price of the service good, which is mainly the wage rate, rises by less than 
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income, as shown in Figure 2 and as is clear intuitively. Hence, the demand for the 
service good increases and its production increases with it. 
 
9. Extensions 
This section discusses briefly three additional implications of the approach presented in 
the paper. First, it shows that the model can account not only for global growth, but also 
for the great divergence between regions since the industrial revolution. Second, it shows 
that energy prices can have a negative effect on the rate of economic growth. Note that 
energy is strongly related to this model, since replacing workers by machines also 
replaces human energy by thermal energy. Finally this section discusses the interpretation 
of TFP growth along the growth path in this model. 
9.1. Divergence between Regions 
So far this model has been used to describe global economic growth, namely it implicitly 
assumes that the closed economy is the world. Next we show that the model can be 
applied to explain large and growing differences across countries. As shown in many 
empirical studies, like Maddison (1995), Pritchett (1998), and Bourguignon and Morrison 
(2002), gaps between regions in the world have been increasing significantly since the 
beginning of the industrial revolution. This section shows how this model can account for 
such findings.11 
 Consider a world with two countries, or regions, A and B. The two countries are 
similar except in their basic productivity a, and it is assumed that aA > aB. Furthermore, 
assume that: 
                                                 
11 This sub-section extends the Zeira (1998) results by adding endogenous innovation. 
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(29)  .1
b
a
b
a BA >+> ρ  
Assume also that there is full capital mobility in the world. For simplicity assume that the 
intermediate goods are not tradable. The equilibrium in this economy is straightforward. 
Since the gross interest rate must satisfy: baR At > , economy A grows at a positive rate, 
which is higher than a . Economy B is stagnant and gets stuck at a fixed 
level of wages and output per capita.
1)1( 11 −+ −− ρbA
12 
 This model can therefore account for very different regional growth performance, 
due to disparities in basic productivity. It is interesting to examine the data presented by 
Maddison (2001) with respect to two main regions. Region A is Western Europe, 
Western Offshoots and Japan. Region B is the rest of the world. In 1500 GDP per capita 
in A was 704, while GDP per capita in B was 535. Until 1820 GDP per capita in A rose 
to 1,130, a rise of 60%, while GDP per capita in B rose only to 573, a rise of 7%. This 
shows that at the outset of the industrial revolution the productivity difference between 
regions was already significant. 
 Finally, the model can be applied in a similar way to differences in cost of 
machines, in addition to differences in productivity. A country that faces a high cost of 
machines, due to import costs, has a higher b and as a result growth slows down and may 
even stagnate completely. This result of the model is related to the empirical finding of 
Barro (1991) and other recent cross-country studies, who find that high costs of 
investment goods have a strong negative effect on growth.  
                                                 
12 This equilibrium has one aspect which is not realistic, namely that consumption in both A and B grows at 
the same rate. This means that consumption in the stagnant economy has very low levels in period 0. This 
result is due to the Ramsey framework and to having the same interest rate in both economies. One way to 
avoid this type of result is to assume instead an OLG economy with utility from bequests, and with 
minimum subsistence consumption.  
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9.2. Energy and Growth 
It is important to remember that machines that replace humans in various jobs require 
energy to operate. Hence machines that replace workers also replace the source of energy, 
from human energy to fossil energy, being either coal or oil. Thus, if we want to model 
the process of replacing workers by machines more realistically, we should add the 
energy requirements of machines as well. Next we extend the model in this direction in a 
very simplified way. Assume that when an intermediate good i is produced by machines 
it requires a machine of size m(i) and an input of energy of size e(i). Assume that the 
price of energy is q, and that it is fixed over time. The condition for industrialization is 
similar to the benchmark model: 
(30)  ).()()()( ilwikRiqeimR ttt +≤+  
Similarly the condition that determines the factor price frontier is: 
(31)   .log)]}()(log[)],()(min{log[
1
0
adiilwikRiqeimR ttt =++∫
It can be shown that the equilibrium is similar to the industrial growth equilibrium 
described above in Section 5. But the long run growth in this case depends crucially on 
the price of energy. If the price rises during the period of industrialization it can hold it 
down and even stop it. Hence, this model implies that the growth process is inherently 
bounded by the supply of energy on our planet. Of course, we can assume that the stock 
of energy on our planet is large enough, and that even when it is depleted we will be able 
to find other ways of harnessing solar energy to our use. But this brief analysis 
demonstrates that the price of energy is crucial for the process of industrialization and 
economic growth. 
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9.3. TFP Growth 
Economic growth is accompanied with the growth of the Solow residual, which is also 
called total factor productivity. In this paper it is hard to distinguish between capital 
accumulation and total factor productivity, since technologies are embodied in machines, 
in capital goods. We next examine directly total factor productivity as it is measured in 
all studies, and show that the measure is actually equal to: 
 
.log)1(log)]1log()1(log[
loglogloglogloglog

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−++−−−−=
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Note that the first item on the RHS is the entropy of sK and is thus quite stable. So is the 
interest rate in our model, namely log R. Hence, according to this formulation, most of 
the changes in TFP are driven by changes in wages. This means that TFP growth might 
measure not exogenous productivity, but rather rising wages. As shown in this model, 
these wages are also intricately related to the process of growth and technical progress, 
but the causalities might be very different.  
 
10. Summary 
This paper presents a model of industrialization, and describes it as a process of inventing 
new machines that replace workers in a growing set of tasks. In this process the wage rate 
plays a critical role. Wages serve as an incentive for adopting new technologies. But 
wages are also affected by technologies, since performance of some tasks by machines 
raises wages of workers, who perform the remaining tasks, due to higher marginal 
productivity. This feedback between wages and technology is the main mechanism that 
 28
drives the results of this paper. It explains how the growth process can continue for long 
periods, it explains how growth is so sensitive to productivity, and it also explains why 
monopoly deters growth. 
 Finally, it is time to briefly discuss the type of innovations in this paper, namely 
machines that replace human labor. Although this is only one specific type of innovation, 
it can be shown to be quite common and general. Even an innovation that replaces a 
machine by a better machine also enables the workers operating it to use less labor in 
production. Furthermore, even innovations of new consumption goods tend to replace 
labor this way or the other. A dishwasher, TV dinner, radio, cinema, all replace labor, 
either at home, or in other locations. We do not have to go back to in history to the 
Ludites, to realize that new machines that replace human labor have had a central role in 
economic growth since the industrial revolution. This paper shows that embodying this 
insight into growth theory can help us significantly in understanding the growth process. 
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 Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
Note that (8) can be rewritten as: 
(A1)  .)]}()(log[),(min{logloglog
1
0
∫ +−= diilRwikimaR ttt  
The integral on the RHS of (A1) is increasing with the ratio of factor prices wt/Rt. Due to 
our assumptions on mi this integral is also bounded, since: 
  .log)(log)]}()(log[),(min{log
1
0
1
0
∞<=≤+ ∫∫ bdiimdiilRwikim tt  
Furthermore, it is clear that as the ratio of factor prices rises, the set of industrialized 
intermediate goods I increases and converges to [0, 1]. Hence, the integral converges to 
the upper bound, namely to log b. As is clear from (A1), as the wage rate rises to ∞, log R 
converges to log a – log b. As a result R is bounded by and converges to a/b.  QED. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
The function H can also be written as: 
   .)]()(log[)](log[min),( 

 ++= ∫∫
cII
I
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Using the envelope theorem we get: 
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and similarly for HR.         QED. 
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Proof of Proposition 2: 
Maximum output Y  is defined by: ),( LKF=
(A2)     .)()(,)()()()(:)(loglogmaxlog
1
0
)(, 

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I II
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The maximization of (A2), using two shadow prices, z1 and z2 for the two constraints 
respectively, yields the following first order conditions: 
(A3)  ),(
)(
1
1 imzix
=  
if i , and I∈
(A4)  ),()(
)(
1
21 ilzikzix
+=  
if i , and I∉
(A5)   ),()()( 211 ilzikzimz +=
at the border points between I and Ic. Define YzR 1=  and Yzw 2= . By substituting (A2), 
(A3) and (A4) into the production function (1) we get: 
   .log),( aRwH =
Hence, the optimal allocation of labor and capital between the intermediate goods is the 
equilibrium allocation and output is optimal. 
Note that: 
  .1log 1 Y
Rz
Y
MPK
dK
Yd ===  
Hence the marginal productivity of capital is equal to R and similarly the marginal 
productivity of labor is equal to w. 
A central planner maximizes output in each period and intertemporally maximizes: 
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It can be shown that the first order conditions of this maximization are equal to the 
dynamic conditions of the competitive equilibrium. Hence, the competitive equilibrium is 
optimal.         QED.  
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
Note first that from utility maximization we get the first order condition: 
  ,
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++ t
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so that the long run growth of consumption is: 
  .01
1
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 Denote by K the amount of capital in production of the physical good. Then the rate of 
growth of K is: 
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Since qt converges to a/b and since s is bounded by 1, it follows that the rate of growth of 
capital must converge to that of consumption. Hence the ratio between consumption of 
the physical good and capital in its production converges to: 
  .
)1( ρ
ρ
+b
a  
Second, note that the amount of labor in production of the physical good is no longer 
equal to the overall supply of labor. Due to (28) this amount of labor is equal to: 
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From equation (A7) and from Figure 2 we get: 
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Since c/K converges to a finite number, since q – R converges to zero, and so is k*/k, it 
therefore follows that Lt converges to zero as the economy grows. Hence, the share of 
labor in production of the physical good converges to zero, while the share of labor in 
production of services increases continuously to 1. The amount of services s converges to 
1 as well. 
We next calculate the ratio between labor income and capital income: 
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Hence the share of labor in total income converges to: 
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The share of labor therefore does not diminish to zero.    QED. 
 
 33
References 
Aghion, Philippe, and Howitt, Peter. “A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction,” 
Econometrica, Vol. 60 (2), March 1992, p. 323-351. 
 
Aghion, Philippe, and Howitt, Peter. Endogenous Growth Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1998. 
 
Barro, Robert j. “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries,” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 106 (1991), 407-443. 
 
Barro, Robert J., and Sala-i-Martin, Xavier. Economic Growth. New York: McGraw Hill, 
1995. 
 
Basu, Susantu, and Weil, David N. “Appropriate Technology and Growth,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 113 (1998), 1025-1054. 
 
Beaudry, Paul, and Collard, Fabrice. “Why Has the Employment-Productivity Tradeoff 
Among Industrialized Countries Been So Strong?” NBER Working Paper No. 
8754, 2002.  
 
Bourguignon, François, and Morrison, Christian. “Inequality Among World Citizens: 
1820-1992,” American Economic Review, Vol. 92, Sep. 2002, p. 727-744. 
 
Champernowne, David. “A Dynamic Growth Model Involving a Production Function,” in 
F.A. Lutz and D.C. Hague, eds., The Theory of Capital (New York: Macmillan, 
1963). 
 
De Long, Bradford J. “Productivity and Machinery Investment: A Long-Run Look, 1870-
1980,” Journal of Economic History, LIII (1992). 
 
Grossman, Gene M. and Helpman, Elhanan. Innovation and Growth in the Global 
Economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. 
 
Habbakuk, H. J. American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1962. 
 
Jones, Charles I. “Time Series Tests of Endogenous Growth Models,” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 110 (2), May 1995 (a), p. 495-525. 
 
Jones, Charles I. “R & D-Based Models of Economic Growth,” Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 103, August 1995 (b), p. 759-784. 
 
Jones, Charles I. and Williams, John C. “Too Much of a Good Thing? The Economics of 
Investment in R&D,” Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 5, March 2000, p. 65-85. 
 
 34
 35
Jones, Larry, and Manuelli, Rodolfo. “A Convex Model of Equilibrium Growth: Theory 
and Implications,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, 1990, p. 1008-1038. 
 
Maddison, Angus. Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992. Paris, France: OECD, 
1995. 
 
Maddison, Angus. The World Economy: A Millenial Perspective. Paris, France: OECD, 
2001. 
 
Marx, Karl, and Engels, Frederick. The Communist Manifesto. London: Verso, 1998. 
 
Pritchett, Lant. “Divergence, Big Time,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, 
Summer 1997, p. 3-17. 
 
Rebelo, Sergio. “Long Run Policy Analysis and Long Run Growth,” Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 99, June 1991, p. 500-521. 
 
Romer, Paul M. “Endogenous Technical Change,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, 
October 1990, p. S71-S102. 
 
Saint-Paul, Gilles. “Distribution and Growth in an Economy with Limited Needs,” 
Economic Journal, forthcoming, 2005. 
 
Segestrom, Paul S., Anant T.C.A. and Dinopoulos, Elias. “A Schumpeterian Model of the 
Product Life Cycle,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 80 (5), December 
1990, p. 1077-1091. 
 
Solow, Robert M. “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 71 (1956), 65-94. 
 
Solow, Robert M. “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,” Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 39 (1957), 312-320. 
 
Solow, Robert M. “Investment and Technical Progress,” in Kenneth J. Arrow, Samuel 
Karlin and P. Suppes, eds., Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960). 
 
Zeira, Joseph. “Workers, Machines and Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 113 (1998), 1091-1113. 
 
Zuleta, Hernando. “Why Factor Income Shares Seem to be Constant?” mimeo, 
2003. 
 
  
